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of state legislation which seemed to violate a basic premise of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress, the Supreme Court and the courts of last resort of two states have acted to
destroy the effectiveness of state laws which prohibited ownership of
land by aliens ineligible for citizenship. These laws incorporated whatever classification Congress established for naturalization purposes into
state statutes determining rights to own land. This process has resulted
in recent years in discrimination against Orientals, particularly Japanese.1 The purpose of this comment is to trace the demise of certain of
these statutes and to consider the broader question of whether state
legislation which restricts alien ownership of land on other than racial
grounds meets the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I. The Common Law
The rules of the common law concerning the rights of aliens to hold
land were laid down by the United States Supreme Court in a series
of early decisions. 2 The principal rules derived from the common law
are (I) that an alien may take land by deed or devise, (2) that an alien
may not take land by descent or otherwise by "operation of law," (3)
that an alien who takes land by deed or devise has a good title against
everyone except the state which, by a proceeding known as "office
found" may divest him of his title, ( 4) that an alien has no "inheritable
blood" so that no person can take by descent who must take title
exclusively through an alien.
The state governments have the power to control alien ownership
of land within their respective borders3 and, historically, have been free
either to extend these common law rights,4 or restrict them. 5
l See McGovney, "The Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Ten Other States,''
35 CALIF. L. REv. 7 (1947); Ferguson, ''The California Alien Land Law and the Fourteenth Amendment,''. 35 CALIF. L. REv. 61 (1947).
2 Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch (II U.S.) 603 (1812); Phillips v.
Moore, 100 U.S. 208 (1879); Orr v. Hodgson, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 453 (1819). The
core of the common law rules is the idea that an alien cannot hold land against the claim
of the state. The rule has been explained as a conclusion from the nature of the feudal
system where an alien could not enter into the personal relation with the sovereign, 5
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §1377 (1939), and as a generalization of the claims of English
kings to seize the land of French enemies, POLLOCK AND MArn.ANI>, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
I.Aw 444-446 (1895).
8 Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 603 (1812); Lessee of
Levy v. M'Cartee, 6 Pet. (31 U.S.) 102 (1832); Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. (15 U.S.)
259 (1817).
4 Beard v. Rowan, 9 Pet. (34 U.S.) 301 (1835).
5Mager v. Grima, 8 How. (49 U.S.) 490 (1850).
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IL State Statutory Provisions
Pursuant to the power to control ownership of land within their
borders, the states have passed various types of legislation concerning
aliens' rights to land during the 175-year history of this country. At
the present time, a study reveals nine types of state statutory restrictions.
1. Twenty-one states have abolished the distinction between citizen and alien in regard to the acquisition, use and disposal of land.6
2. In five states, statutory limitations exist as to the amount of land
that an alien may acquire under certain circumstances.7
3. Eight states limit the length of time that an alien may hold land
lawfully acquired.8
4. Resident aliens are given rights equal to those of citizens in
seven states.9
5. Four states have statutes which condition the right of an alien
6 Alabama: Ala. Code (1940) tit. 47, §1; Colorado: 35 Colo. Stat. Ann. (1921) c. 7,
§6; Delaware: Del. Rev. Code (1935) § § 3655 to 3657; Georgia: Ga. Code (1935) §79-303;
Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 154, §2; Maryland: Md. Ann. Code (Flack, 1951) art. 3,
§1; Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 184, §1; Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws
(1948) §554.135; Nevada: Nev. Comp. Laws (1943, 1949 Supp.) §6365; New Jersey:
N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §§3:3-13, 46:3-18; New York: 49 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney,
1945) §10(2); North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. (1949) §64-1; North Dakota: N.D. Rev.
Code (1943) §§56-0116, 47-0111; Ohio: Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938) §10503-13; Rhode
Island: R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 432, §1; South Dakota: S.D. Code (1939) §56.0120;
Tennessee: 5 Tenn. Code (Williams, 1934) §7187; Utah: Utah Code (1953) §74-4-24;
Virginia: 8 Va. Code (1950) §55-1; West Virginia: W.Va. Code (1949) §3541. Vermont
abolished the common law rules by judicial decision: State v. Boston, Concord & Montreal
R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 433 (1853). The distinction between "friendly" and "enemy" aliens
exists in some state laws, but is irrelevant for our purposes. For analysis of state statutory
provisions along other lines of classification, see GmsoN, ALIENS AND THB LAw (1940),
and 5 VERNIER, AMEmcAN FAMILY LAws §288 et seq. (1931).
1 Pennsylvania: 68 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1931) §§22 to 60, 20 Pa. Stat. Ann.
(Purdon, 1950) §180-17; South Carolina: 5 S.C. Code (1952) §§57-103, 57-104, 57-101;
Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. (1951) §§234.22, 234.23; Iowa: Iowa Const., art. I, §22, Iowa Code
(1950) §567.1 et seq.; Minnesota: Minn. Stat. (1949) §500.22.
s Illinois:
Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 6, §§1 to 5; Iowa: Iowa Const., art. I, §22, Iowa
Code (1950) § 567.1 et seq.; Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) § 381.320; Oklahoma: Okla.
Stat. (1951) §§84-229, 60-122; Texas: Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1951) §2583, 1 Tex. Civ.
Stat. (Vernon, 1947) §166 et seq.; Nebraska: 4 Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §76-402 et seq.;
Indiana: Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1951) §56-504 et seq.; Washington: 11 Wash. Rev. Stat.
(Remington, 1933) §10581 et seq.
9 Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) §7166 et seq.; Iowa: Iowa Const., art. I, §22,
Iowa Code (1950) §567.1 et seq.; Mississippi: 1 Miss. Code (1942) §842; New Hampshire:
2 N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 259, §19; Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. (1951) §§84-229, 60-122;
Texas: Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1951) §2583, 1 Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1947) §166 et
seq.; Wyoming: Wyo. Const., art. I, §29. However, in Wyoming there exists a statute
restricting rights to eligible citizens, except for Chinese. Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1945) §66-401
et seq.
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to inherit real property on the existence of reciprocal rights for American citizens in the nation of which the alien is a citizen.10
6. The common law appears to be in force in toto in one state,
Oregon, and in part in other states.11
7. One state, Arkansas, has a statute based expressly on race, which
prohibits Japanese from holding land, while granting full citizens' rights
to other aliens. 12
8. Five states grant full rights to aliens who have declared their
intention to become American citizens.13
9. Nine states have statutes which grant full rights to aliens eligible
for citizenship, and no rights to ineligible aliens. This type of statute
has been under atttack for a number of years and will be discussed in
detail below.14
These state laws are, of course, subject to the paramount power of
the federal government to make treaties which can alter or increase the
rights of alien nationals of the government with which the treaty is
made.15 Our concern, however, is with the impact of the Fourteenth
Amendment on these various types of statutes, first as to racially dis10 Arizona: Ariz. Code (1939) §39-111; California: Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1944)
Act 260, §l et seq.; Montana: 6 Mont. Rev. Code (1947) §§91-418, 91-520; Oklahoma:
Okla. Stat. (1951) §§84-229, 60-122. This type of statute has been upheld as not impinging
on the federal government's power over foreign affairs or foreign commerce. Clark v. Allen,
331 U.S. 503, 67 S.Ct. 1431 (1947). See also In re Knutzen's Estate, 31 Cal. (2d) 573,
191 P. (2d) 747 (1948).
11 In Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 204 P. (2d) 569 (1949), the Oregon court
invalidated the state statutory scheme based on eligibility for citizenship. Ore. Comp Laws
(1940) §61-101 et seq. Thereafter, the legislature repealed all of its regulation of alien
ownership of land. Ore. Laws, 1949, c. 350. The common law as expressed in Quinn v.
Ladd, 37 Ore. 261, 59 P. 457 (1899), would appear to be in force. This has been held to
result on repeal of alien land laws in other jurisdictions. Donaldson v. State, (Ind. 1903)
67 N.E. 1029; Johnson v. Olson, 92 Kan. 819, 142 P. 256 (1914). See also, Hanafin v.
McCarthy, 95 N.H. 36, 57 A. (2d) 148 (1948).
12 Ark. Stat. (1947) §50-301 et seq. This statute probably violates the state constitutional requirement that all resident aliens be treated as citizens in regard to real property,
art. 2, §20. Applegate v. Luke, 173 Ark. 93, 291 S.W. 978 (1927). It undoubtedly violates the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16 (1917); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948).
1s Indiana: Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1951) §56-504 et seq.; Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat.
(1948) §301.320; Minnesota: Minn. Stat. (1949) §500.22; Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949)
§§9.010 to 9.030; Washington: 11 Wash. Rev. Stat. (Remington, 1933) §10581 et seq.
14Arizona: Ariz. Code (1939) §39-111; California: Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1944)
Act 260, § 1 et seq.; Florida: Fla. Stat. (1951 Supp.) § 731.28, Declaration of Rights § 18
(all aliens, however, may take by descent); Idaho: Idaho Code (1948) §24-101 et seq.;
Kansas: Kan. Gen. Stats. (Corrick, 1947) §59-511; Louisiana: La. Const., art. 19, §21;
Montana: 6 Mont. Rev. Code (1947) §§91-520, 91-418; New Mexico: N.M. Stat. (1941)
§75-121; Wyoming: see note 9 supra.
15 See, for example, Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 52 S.Ct. 81 (1931); Geofroy
v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 10 S.Ct. 295 (1890); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 49 S.Ct.
223 (1929). For a study of inheritance rights granted by treaty, see Boyd, "Treaties Governing the Succession to Real Property by Aliens," supra p. 1001.
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criminatory laws and, secondly, as to land laws dealing with "aliens"
generally as a class and establishing rights to own land different from
those enjoyed by citizens.

III. The General Impact of the Fourteenth Amendment
"... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."16
At the outset, it is clear that the type of state legislation we are
considering here constitutes "state action,"17 that aliens are "persons"18
and that the term "property" includes the right to acquire, use and
dispose of real property,1 9 all within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The due process and equal protection clauses clearly prohibit more
obvious types of state action which might deprive aliens of certain definitely established rights to real property. For example, when the Montana state legislature changed the statutory conditions under which nonresident aliens would be entitled to take real property by descent, the
state court held that rights which had vested under the earlier statute
could not be affected by the later enactment.20 Likewise, an ordinance
of the County of San Francisco which required Chinese to move into
a limited part of the county or get out altogether was held, in a scathing
opinion, to be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, a federal
statute concerning rights of citizens, and our then existing treaty with
China.21
A California statute which prohibited an alien parent from acting
as guardian as to that part of a minor's estate which the alien was ineligible under state law to hold in his own right was invalidated in 1922.
The California Court of Appeals could find no rational relation between the fact of ineligibility for citizenship and the competency of a
16 United States Constitution, Amend. XIV, §1.
17 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm., 334 U.S. 410,
18 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064

68 S.Ct. 1138 (1948).
(1886), invalidated California
legislation which in operation denied to Chinese aliens the right to carry on laundry business. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 7 (1915), invalidated a state statute requiring
employers of more than five persons to employ at least eighty per cent American citizens.
19 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16 (1917), invalidated a city ordinance
prohibiting Negroes from residing or owning residential property in certain sections of the
city. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948), prohibiting court enforcement
of racially discriminatory restrictive covenants in deeds of land.
20 In re Nossen's Estate, 118 Mont. 40, 162 P. (2d) 216 (1945).
21 In re Lee Sing, (C.C. Cal. 1890) 43 F. 359.
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person to act as a guardian.22 The Washington Supreme Court upheld
such a statute on the grounds that the classification applied to all minors
and persons attempting to be guardians and that the California interpretation did not face the practical facts of life.23

IV. Racially Discriminatory Statutes
State legislation restricting the alien's rights to land has been before
the United States Supreme Court a number of times. The attack on
these statutes has been on the grounds that they violate the equal protection clause because the classifications used were "unreasonable."
The first case on this subject to be expressly decided by the Supreme
Court was Terrace v. Thompson in 1923.24 Under attack was a statute
of Washington which denied to aliens who had not declared their intent
to become citizens the right to own land within the state. The Court,
speaking through Justice Butler, held the statute constitutional. Justice
Butler premised his argument on the power of the state to deny aliens
the right to own land within its borders. He said that the inclusion of
good faith declarants in the same class with citizens was not an arbitrary
or capricious discrimination against non-declarant aliens. A more detailed examination of the reasoning in this decision will be considered
below. Although the Court did not consider the question of racial discrimination, the case is nevertheless significant in this context because
it was held to control the decision in another case, Porterfield v.
Wehh~ 2 r; before the Court at the same time.
That case involved a California statute which prohibited only aliens
ineligible for citizenship from holding land in the state. It did not forbid aliens who were eligible but had not declared their intent to become
citizens from holding land, as did the Washington statute involved in
the Terrace case. The category of aliens ineligible for citizenship is
clearly narrower than the category of aliens who have declared their
intent to become citizens, at least in terms of the number of persons
included. The Court held that the principles of the Terrace case were
22 In
23 In

re Yano's Estate, 188 Cal. 645, 206 P. 995 (1922).
re Fujimoto's Guardianship, 130 Wash. 188, 226 P. 505 (1924). The decision
was written long before Chief Justice Vinson wrote in CardO'Zian language that the Fourteenth Amendment was not satisfied by "indiscriminate imposition of inequalities." Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 at 22, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948).
24 263 U.S. 197, 44 S.Ct. 15 (1923).
2 5 263 U.S. 225, 44 S.Ct. 21 (1923). Two other cases involving the California statute
were decided at the same time, but add nothing to the constitutional doctrines established
in Terrace and Porterfield, except to show that the Court was willing to uphold a good part
of the ancillary legislation connected with the Alien Land Law. Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S.
313, 44 S.Ct. 112 (1923); Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326, 44 S.Ct. 115 (1923).
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controlling and said: "In the case now before us the prohibited class
includes ineligible aliens only. In the matter of classification, the States
have wide discretion. . . . It is not always practical or desirable that
legislation shall be the same in different States. We cannot say that the
failure ... to extend the prohibited class so as to include eligible aliens
who have failed to declare their intention to become citizens of the
United States was arbitrary or unreasonable." 26
Thus the Court allowed a prior decision on a broader classification
to control the question of the validity of a narrower classification which
surely deserved independent examination. 27 The California Court of
Appeals, only one year before this decision, had stated that the purpose
of this same statute was to "discourage the coming of Japanese into this
state...."28 The Supreme Court did not recognize this fact.
Two years later, the Court upheld as reasonable a provision of the
same California statute that conveyances made to citizens where the
purchase money was paid by ineligible aliens were presumed to have
been made with intent to evade the statute and thus give beneficial
ownership to one ineligible for ownership.29 In 1948 this same presumption was held invalid under the circumstances involved in the case
of Oyama v. California. 30 That case involved a conveyance from a citizen to the citizen son of an alien ineligible for citizenship and thus
ineligible, in California, to own land. Purchase money was paid by the
alien father. Chief Justice Vinson wrote an opinion to the effect that
the son was deprived of equal protection because sons of other parents
who purchased land for them had the benefit of a presumption of gift.
The statutory presumption in this context deprived the son of an ineligible alien of the protection of the presumption of gift given to sons
of other parents, thus denying equal protection. The opinion rejected
the the argument that such discrimination was necessary to prevent
evasion of the alien land law by holding that the method was unconstitutional, even "assuming for the purposes of argument only, that the
basic prohibition is constitutional."31
26 263
27 See

U.S. 225 at 233, 44 S.Ct. 15 (1923).
analysis of the decision in Powell, "Alien Land Cases in United States Supreme
Court," 12 CALIF. L. RBv. 259 (1924), and McGovney, ''The Anti-Japanese Land Laws
of California and Ten Other States," 35 CALIP. L. RBv. 7 (1947).
28 In re Yano's Estate, 188 Cal. 645 at 658, 206 P. 995 (1922).
20 Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258, 45 S.Ct. 490 (1925).
so 332 U.S. 633, 68 S.Ct. 269 (1948).
31 Id. at 646. The Chief Justice distinguished the Cockrill case (note 29 supra), in
which the statutory presumption was upheld, on the ground that there, the purchase money
had been paid by an alien not related to the grantee. The statutory presumption, in effect,
created a purchase money trust in favor of the alien. This result was in line with general
California law.

1060

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 51

Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge concurred in the
decision, but on the grounds that the statute was racially oriented and
. should be struck down as a denial of equal protection for that reason.
Dissenting were Justices Reed, Burton and Jackson who believed that
the presumption was reasonable and valid if the underlying statute was
valid.· They did not reach the basic constitutional question.
In the same year, 1948, the Supreme Court decided Takahashi 17.
Fish and Game Commission. 82 A California statute which in effect
prohibited aliens ineligible for citizenship from commercial :fishing in
the waters off California was held invalid. The Court assumed that the
object of the statute was either to conserve the £sh in the coastal waters,
or to protect citizens from competition by Japanese, or both. Congressional policy expressed in the naturalization laws was held irrelevant
to a consideration of the rights of aliens to earn a living in the state.
The equal protection clause applied, the Court said, to aliens as well as
citizens. California's claim of a "special interest" in the £sh as supporting their classification was rejected. The presumption of reasonableness expressed in the earlier land law cases was not present in the
Court's analysis of this case. The principles of Truax 11. Raich, to be
discussed later, were clearly controlling.33
Finally, the Court met the argument that the statute should be
upheld by analogy to the Terrace and Porterfield decisions. The Court
said: "Assuming the continued validity of those [alien land law] cases,
we think they could not in any event be controlling here. They rested
solely upon the power of states to control the devolution and ownership
of land within their borders, a power long exercised and supported on
reasons peculiar to real property."34
The Oyama decision, coupled with the broad language concerning
the rights of aliens in the Takahashi case, cast doubt on the continued
validity of the 1923 cases. This doubt was so considerable that the
courts of two states have since declared their state statutes which denied ineligible aliens the right to own lands to be unconstitutional.
In Namba 17. McCourt, the Supreme Court of Oregon analyzed the
old alien land law cases and compared them with the recent decisions
as follows:
'We do not believe that the present membership of the Federal
Supreme Court discarded the principles of constitutional law
which Mr. Justice Butler employed ... , but think that it assigned
s2 334 U.S. 410, 68 S.Ct. 1138 (1948).
33 239
34 334

U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 7 (1915). See discussion in Part V infra.
U.S. 410 at 422, 68 S.Ct. 1138 (1948).
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greater value to some rules and circumstances than he did. For
instance> it assigned greater value than he to (I) the right of all
aliens ... to engage in ordinary occupations, (2) the freedom of
all rights from impairment by legislation which is based upon ...
color, race or creed, and (3) the desirability ... of having the
Federal government alone enact special laws concerning the status
. ....7135
of a11ens
The California Supreme Court took the same approach in Sei Fujii
v. State, deciding in 1952 that the statute which had been expressly
upheld in 1923 was now unconstitutional.36 The court said: "... the
presumption of validity is greatly narrowed in scope, if not entirely
dispelled, whenever it is shown, as here, that legislation actually discriminates against certain persons because of their race or nationality.
This view ... is irreconcilable with the approach previously taken by ...
[the United States Supreme Court] in the Porterfield case...."37
Thus, by mid-1952, it was judicially established that the system of
limiting alien ownership of land by reference to their eligibility for
citizenship was unconstitutional because it discriminated against persons on the basis of race. It is certain that the more overt discrimination
which appears in the Arkansas statute which prohibits Japanese from
owning land will fall once it is tested.38
A few months after the Sei Fujii decision, state land laws based on
the eligibility concept were rendered meaningless by an act of Congress.
Included in the much discussed Immigration and Naturalization Act of
1952 (the McCarran-Walter Act) were provisions which eliminated
race as a criterion for eligibility for citizenship.39
While the act certainly will not open wide the gates of the nation
to those Oriental races formerly denied all rights to become citizens, the
principle is now clear that race is not a relevant factor in determining
eligibility for citizenship.
As the laws of California and other states have been administered
solely on the basis of racial ineligibility,40 they have been rendered
Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579 at 604-605, 204 P. (2d) 569 (1949).
38 Cal. (2d) 718, 242 P. (2d) 617 (1952).
37 Id. at 731.
38 See note 12 supra.
3 9 P.L. 414, c. 477, 82d Cong., 2d sess. (1952) §311. A comprehensive picture of the
development of federal immigration and naturalization policies appears in H. Rep. 1365
(Feb. 14, 1952) appearing in 2 CoNG. Conn & ADM. Nnws 1653 (1952). See especially
on this point the discussion on p. 1679.
40 McGovney, "The Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Ten Other States," 35
CAI.IF. L. Rnv. 7 (1947); Ferguson, "The California Alien Land Law and the Fourteenth
Amendment," 35 CALIF. L. Rnv. 61 (1947).
35

36
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useless for the purpose of preventing certain racial groups from holding
land. The only aliens now ineligible for citizenship who can lawfully
be in the country are draft dodgers, deserters from the armed forces,
and those who have declined to serve in the United States Armed
Forces. 41 These classifications present no equal protection problem.
At present, the states where the California type alien land laws are
in effect have laws as liberal as -those states where no discriminatory
legislation existed in the first place.42

V. Alienage as a Reasonable Classi-fication in Land Laws
While questions concerning the validity of racially discriminatory
statutes have either been settled or become moot, the problem of land
laws which discriminate against aliens on a non-racial basis, for economic reasons, from a strong sense of provincialism, or as a hangover
from the common law is far from settled. This question has received
little attention in the literature on the subject of alien land laws. The
prime concern of the writers has been with racially oriented statutes.48
· The thread running through the cases which involve the Fourteenth
Amendment, particularly the equal protection clause, involves a concept of reasonable classification. A state will not be permitted to set up
a legislative category that is deemed "arbitrary" and impose peculiar
restrictions on persons within that category. A classification is deemed
reasonable if some sort of "rational relation" can be found between the
classification and the legitimate purposes of the legislation. The Supreme Court has never said that the classification of persons as "aliens"
is unreasonable per se.44
The case of Truax 11. Raich, decided in 1915, involved an allegation
that legislation imposing certain limits on aliens as a class did not meet
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.45 That case concerned an Arizona statute which required any employer of more than
five persons to have at least eighty per cent of his employees American
citizens. The statute was invalidated by the Supreme Court. The
rationale of the case, that a state cannot lawfully impose limitations on
See H. Rep. 1365 (Feb. 14, 1952), 2 CoNG. CoDE & ADM. NEws 1740 (1952).
See text in part II supra.
43 On the general topic of racially discriminatory laws see articles cited in note 40 supra
and the following notes and comments: 36 CALIF. L. Rllv. 320 (1948); 46 MICH. L. Rllv.
830 (1948); 22 So. CAL. L. Rllv. 177 (1949); 24 WAsH. L. Rllv. 162 (1949); 56 YALE
L.J. 1017 (1947).
44 See Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 47 S.Ct. 630 (1927), for a
statement of these constitutional principles in relation to the question of whether a city can
refuse an alien a license to operate a billiard hall.
45 239 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 7 (1915).
41

42
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the ability of an alien to earn a living within its boundaries, was expressly held, however, not to impinge upon the power of a state to deal
with titles to real property.
The concern of the Court was with the power of a state to impair
an alien's ability to earn a living. This was considered as involving a
claim that the state could exclude aliens altogether-a power held to
exist solely in the federal government.
It may not be essential to the ability of an alien to earn a living that
he be able to take and hold real property in the same manner as a citizen,
but ownership of land is certainly related to the ability of any person to
earn a living. A basic illustration of this point is the use of land for
farming purposes. While an alien may be able to work on another's
farm, if he owns land he has an opportunity to receive a larger return
on his investment of energy and capital. This factor is surely an element in the ability of a person to earn a living. In the case of property
held for rental purposes, it can reasonably be said that the ownership
of property itself is a method of earning a living.
The Truax case makes clear that a state cannot restrict "non-essential" economic opportunities of aliens. The Arizona statute was invalidated even though it could be argued that it is not essential for an alien
to work for an employer hiring more than five employees in order to
earn his living. Furthermore, as we have seen, the Supreme Court, in
the Takahashi case, has expressly rejected as grounds for restricting
alien rights, the desire of a state to prevent competition by aliens against
citizens.46 Any impairment of an alien's ability to own land would seem
bound up with this economic factor in some degree. The doctrine of
the Truax case would not have to be pushed far in order to encompass
the ownership of land as an ingredient in the right of an alien to earn
a living.
The other aspect of constitutional law emphasized in the Truax
decision was that state legislation concerning aliens could not invade
the exclusive province of Congress by placing burdens on the freedom
of a lawfully-admitted alien to reside in any state of the Union. This
presents a question of legislative jurisdiction or power over the subject
matter. It is analogous to questions arising under the commerce clause
where state legislation may be invalidated as beyond the power of the
state to act, even within its own territorial jurisdiction.47 A case which
seems clearly to illustrate this proposition is Arrowsmith v. Voorhies,
46 See text at note 32 supra.
47 See, for instance, Wabash,

St. Louis & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 7 S.Ct.
4 (1886); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 45 S.Ct. 324 (1925).
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where a Michigan statute denying the right of "undesirable aliens" as
defined in the Federal Immigration Act to remain or work in the state
was invalidated by a lower federal court.48 The theory of this case was
that the statute usurped the exclusive power of Congress over the control of aliens and immigration. So, to the extent that alien land legislation invades an area of exclusive federal power, it is invalid. This
concept is especially significant in our illustration of the alien who wants
to be a farmer. In this type of case, the inability to own land may well
deter him from settling in a given state which has restrictions on his
freedom.
Even without adopting the concept that a state is without legislative
power to restrain alien ownership of land, it is possible to apply to this
situation the doctrine that state legislation which conflicts with valid
federal laws will be held invalid. 49 This could be done judicially by
implying that the admission of aliens by Congress included the right
on the part of such aliens to own real property in the states under the
theory outlined above. The Truax decision included some of this type
of analysis, as is indicated by the following language: "... the practical
result [of the Arizona policy] would be that those lawfully admitted to
the country under the authority of the acts of Congress, instead of
enjoying in a substantial sense and in their full scope the privileges
conferred by the admission, would be segregated in such of the States
as chose to offer hospitality."50 This statement evidences a judicial
interpolation of certain rights of aliens into the immigration statute.
Thus, the principles of the Truax case lend themselves readily as
support for the conclusion that state statutes restricting the right of
aliens to own land do not meet the requirements of the equal protection
clause.
This constitutional question was faced by the Supreme Court in
Terrace 11. Thompson, the Washington land law case mentioned earlier
in connection with racially discriminatory laws. 51 The court did not
consider the racial aspects of the statute, but decided the case as a simple
question of reasonable classification. The statute upheld in that case,
it will be remembered, prohibited aliens who had not declared their
intent to become citizens from holding land in the state.
(D.C. Mich. 1931) 55 F. (2d) 310.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399 (1940), for a discussion of the
doctrines of conflict, or preemption. In this case a state alien registration statute was held
to be invalid because of the comprehensive federal alien registration laws. And see later
Supreme Court elaborations of this same idea in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 62
S.Ct. 552 (1942); Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820 (1942).
M 239 U.S. 33 at 42, 36 S.Ct. 7 (1915).
51263 U.S. 197, 44 S.Ct. 15 (1923). See text at note 24 supra.
48

49 See
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Here, briefly, is the Court's analysis of the statute in that case. (I)
In absence of treaty, a state has power to deny aliens the right to own
land within its borders, and such legislation, applying to all aliens, is
not arbitrary or capricious. (2) The inclusion of good faith declarants
in the same legislative category with citizens did not unjustly discriminate against non-declarants. (3) Congress has unlimited power to
govern eligibility for citizenship, but their legislation will be presumed
reasonable and the state may rely on the federally-created classification. 52 ( 4) Aliens might otherwise own all the land within the state.
(5) Aliens will lack interest in and power to work for the welfare of
the state. (6) The state may consider the quality and allegiance of
those who own land as affecting the safety of the state.
The Court's reasoning may be criticized in the light of thirty years'
experience. (I) The power of the states to deny to all aliens the right
to own land is, of course, subject to the Fourteenth Amendment,53 and
any expansion of the Truax case doctrine could cause the statute to be
invalidated. The statement that the legislation is not "arbitrary or
capricious" is a conclusion, avoiding an exploration of the facts which
could lead to a conclusion of_ unreasonableness. And, inasmuch as the
case before the Court did not involve a statute applying to all aliens,
the Court's statements on that point are dictum. (2) The second point
in the Court's reasoning assumes a rational relation between land ownership and the desire or ability of one to become a citizen. This is, at
least, a debatable point. (3) Classifications by the Congress for naturalization or immigration purposes have no relation at all to classifications
in state laws regulating ownership of property. This obvious point has
been expressly pointed out by the Supreme Court.54 ( 4) Aliens, as a
matter of fact, have not overrun the land in the states where they are
52 Compare this quotation from the Terrace case with the statement appearing in the
Takahashi case, note 54, infra: "Congress is not trammeled, and it may grant or withhold
the privilege of naturalization upon any grounds or without any reason, as it sees fit. But
it is not to be supposed that its acts defining eligibility are arbitrary or unsupported by
reasonable considerations of public policy. The State properly may assume that the considerations upon which Congress made such classification are substantial and reasonable••••
The rule established by Congress on this subject, in and of itself, furnishes a reasonable
basis for classification in a state law withholding from aliens the privilege of land ownership ••••" 263 U.S. 197 at 220.
158 See notes 17, 18, and 19 supra.
M Compare this recent statement with the earlier position announced in the Terrace
case, note 52 supra. "It does not follow, as California seems to argue, that because the
United States regulates immigration and naturalization in part on the basis of race and color
classifications, a state can adopt one or more of the same classifications to prevent lawfully
admitted aliens within its borders from earning a living in the same way that other state
inhabitants earn their living. The federal government has broad constitutional powers in
determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain,
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permitted unfettered ownership. The argument is hardly more than
frivolous. (5) The interest of an alien in the state may be considerable,
especially if he has a family of citizen children, and might be even
stronger if he owned land and thus felt the ties of a person protected by
the state. Such ownership might well bring him into a closer social
relation with the community and thus serve to integrate him into our
society.55 (6) The quality and allegiance of aliens lawfully admitted
to this country would seem primarily to be a question for the federal
government acting through the immigration and naturalization laws.
Considering the limited number of aliens in the country and the fact
that they are scattered throughout the nation, this problem seems one
best solved on the national level.56 (7) Aliens would, of course, be
required to abide by laws, and to pay taxes. There appears to be no
substantial basis for the position that aliens constitute an inherent
danger to the national health, safety or morals.57
These arguments, taken in their totality, cast doubt on the validity
· of certain types of statutes considered earlier in section II. Statutes
which, for instance, limit the amount of land an alien may hold, or the
length of time he may hold it, would seem to bear little rational relation
to any legitimate interest of the state. The type of statute which limits
ownership rights to persons who have declared their intent to become
citizens has some appeal in relation to a policy of encouraging aliens
to become citizens once they have come to this country. The crucial
question here, however, is whether the states should, by legislation,
attempt to implement what they believe to be the policy of the federal
government in the immigration and naturalization field, or whether
regulation of their conduct before naturalization and the terms and conditions of their
naturalization.•••Under the Constitution, the states are granted no such powers••••
"All of the foregoing emphasizes the tenuousness of the state's claim that it has power
to single out and ban its lawful alien inhabitants, and particularly certain racial and color
groups within this class of inhabitants, from following a vocation simply because Congress
has put some such groups in special classifications in exercise of its broad and wholly distinguishable powers over immigration and naturalization. The state's law here cannot be
supported in the employment of this legislative authority because of policies adopted by
Congress in the exercise of its power to treat separately and differently with aliens from
countries composed of peoples of many diverse cultures, races, and colors." Takahashi v.
Fish and Game Comm., 334 U.S. 410 at 420 (1948).
55 This argument is pressed in Ferguson, ''The California Alien Land Law and the
Fourteenth Amendment," 35 CALIF. L. REv. 61 (1947).
56 See Ferguson's comments on this point, note 55 supra, and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399 (1940). See also the excellent discussion involving this and other
related points, by Justice Redfield in his decision that the common law regarding the disabilities of alienage in relation to the holding of land did not apply in Vermont a century
ago. State v. Boston, Concord & Montreal R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 433 (1853).
57 See note 55 supra.
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the formulation and implementation of such a policy should be left
exclusively in the hands of Congress.
To the extent that the common law is in force in a given state, a
problem is created by the force of historical legal id~as. If, however, the
common law was unreasonably discriminatory, there would seem no
good reason for maintaining it in face of the demands of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The technique used in Shelley v. Kraemer, where the
Supreme Court held that racially discriminatory restrictive covenants
could not be enforced by the courts because of the equal protection
clause, destroyed the effectiveness of previously existing common law
rights. 58
The problem that arises when a procedural device is attacked as a
denial of due process does not seem so signi~cant in the equal protection area. In the former case, the fact of long existence and use of the
procedural system gives it a heavy weight in favor of its validity.59 In
the latter case, where the issue is substantive equal protection, the long
existence of a certain legal situation is not so conclusive. 60 The substantive ideas of equal protection were not, of course, developed to anywhere near their present extent at the time the common law was adopted
in this country.
Alfred W. Blumrosen, S.Ed.
58 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948).
59 See, for instance, Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 41
60 The decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, for instance (note

S.Ct. 433 (1921).
58, supra) abruptly cut olf
a long time practice, operating under the sanctions of the common law rights of grantors.

